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1 1918
The eminent Dutch jurist E.M.Meijers [1880-1954] devoted three larger publica-
tions to the subject of imprévision (fundamental change of circumstances). All
three were published at crucial moments in European history: the year the
First World War ended, the year of the German bombardment of Guernica,
and the year the ColdWar became violent. This was not altogether accidental.
The first publication was part of a report presented, in Dutch, to the Dutch
Society of Jurists in 1918.1 Until then, our subject had been a sleeping doctrine
waiting to be kissed to life. Meijers realised its importance for the aftermath
of thewar, and presented his point of view together with the necessary histor-
ical and comparative arguments. Not everybody will have noticed the topical
interest of the subject – the Dutch had been allowed to continue their slumber
as a neutral nation during the war. However, Meijers immediately saw the
chance for a revival, on a purer basis, that is. He explained that the imprévision
doctrine was intimately connected to devastating wars and to natural law
doctrine.2 The latter because of its stress on the intention of the parties, be
it explicit, or implicit, as the clausula rebus sic stantibus is based on a presumed
intention of the parties to a contract.
Having paved the way in a few lines, it was not difficult for Meijers to
show how the idea of imprévision in the past had been put into practice in
Germany, France, and England. He ended this part of his report with the
question: what to think of the judicial decisions of these three countries?
Answer: they certainly have a practical value, but what about their scientific
value? What followed was an argument against the use of the clausula rebus
sic stantibus as a solution to the imprévision problem.3 Meijers concluded that
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1 A French translation of the relevant part of the report entitled ‘Essai historique sur la force
majeure’ has been published in E.M. Meijers/R. Feenstra & H.F.W.D Fischer (eds.), Études
d’histoire du droit. Vol. IV, Leiden: Universitaire Pers Leiden 1966, pp. 27-51, which is the
version I quote.
2 Meijers 1918, p. 29.
3 Meijers 1918, pp. 38-40.
4 1 – Meijers on imprévision in 1918, in 1937, in 1950, and today
all these decisions were only in appearance based on the presumed intention
of the parties. In reality they were equitable solutions in a more palatable
disguise. So away with this fiction and back to the original meaning the
Romans gave to equity in their bona fide contracts. He meant an objective
equity, irrespective of the (subjective) intentions, real or presumed, of the
parties to a contract.
A mere five lines were spent on the Dutch situation: ‘In our country,
however, the clause is superfluous. Theoretically unsound and limitless, it
would do more bad than good’. Meijers then referred to a provision of the
Dutch Civil Code (art. 1374 par. 3) which should allow a Dutch judge to make
equity prevail in exceptional cases. That was all. Nothing about judicial de-
cisions of the past. But there was an expectation for the future in it. It took
almost twenty years before he made another attempt to influence Dutch judicial
practice. He had grown impatient, and was not pleased with the decisions
of the Dutch Supreme Court. And he was not the only academic jurist who
was not. In a note on one of its notorious decisions he could mention that
Scholten and Van Oven, both leading jurists, were on his side.4
In 1936 a report had been presented to the Dutch Society of Jurists, which
defended a view on imprévision that in its essence did not differ much from
the practice he had been fighting against.5 It was time for action.
2 AMSTERDAM 1937
Meijers’s second publication on imprévision – based on a speech given at the
Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences in Amsterdam – , appeared in 1937. Its title
was ‘Goede trouw en stilzwijgende wilsverklaring’ (Good faith and implied
condition).6 It was an attempt to convince, indirectly, the judges of the Dutch
Supreme Court that their interpretation of the concept of ‘good faith’ in the
law of contracts was too narrow. In 1923 a spark of hope had shimmeredwhen
the Dutch Supreme Court decided that if someone acts incorrectly in the
4 See Dutch Supreme Court 2 January 1931, NJ 1931, 274 (Mark is Mark). This case emerged
because of the extreme monetary inflation in Germany after WW I.
5 M. Bregstein, ‘Moet den rechter de bevoegdheid toekomen verbintenissen uit overeenkomst
op bepaalde gronden, zooals de goede trouw, te wijzigen? Zoo ja, in welke gevallen en
in hoeverre?’, in: Handelingen 1936 der Nederlandse Juristen-Vereeniging, deel 1, tweede stuk,
’s-Gravenhage: Belinfante 1936. Bregstein said that a gap (‘leemte’) in a contract could be
filled by a judge on the basis of good faith. This complement should be derived, however,
from the presumed intention of the contracting parties.
6 Mededeelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandsche Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde,
Deel 84, Serie B, no. 5, Amsterdam:Noord-HollandscheUitgeversMaatschappij 1937; reissued
in E.M.Meijers,Verzamelde privaatrechtelijke opstellen. Derde deel (Verbintenissenrecht), Leiden:
Universitaire Pers Leiden 1955, pp. 277-300. I quote the latter version.
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performance of a contract he acts against good faith, even if he is not aware
of the incorrectness of his behaviour.7
The claimant had insured a sire named Artist de Laboureur against the
consequences of roaring, a serious horse disease. In the contract it was stipu-
lated that a board of the insurance companywas to decide about any damages
to be paid. The horse was affected by the disease but the insurance company
refused payment. TheDutch SupremeCourt ruled that not only the (subjective)
outlook of the members of the board, but also the presumed intention of the
parties about a performance according to good faith had to be taken into
account.
Meijers considered the decision a step in the right direction, because the
Dutch Supreme Court seemed to have returned to an interpretation of good
faith in the sense of classical Roman law, that is (objectively) taking into
account all the circumstances relating to a contract and its performance.8 The
winds of change did not blow for long through the stately rooms of the Dutch
Supreme Court in The Hague. As of 1925 an impressive series of decisions
reconfirmed the idea that good faith cannot put aside or even change the
contents of a contract.9
Thus classical Roman lawwas used byMeijers to convince the honourable
judges that their moment of weakness in 1923 stood in a very respectable
tradition, of which later generations unfortunately had not appreciated the
merit. Knowing this would not be enough, Meijers called in the help of some
of his learned colleagues who had tried to make sense of the not particularly
transparent case law of the Dutch Supreme Court.10 Needless to say that none
of them had succeeded in shedding the necessary light on the subject matter.
To put even more emphasis on the seriousness of the matter, Meijers then set
out to add a dose of comparative law to legal history. He did find some
support for his view on good faith in contemporary French law in the sense
that also in France a judge was entitled to explain the express terms of a
contract according to the implied common intention of the parties. Meijers
gave an historical reason for this still restricted interpretation of good faith
both in France and in the Netherlands: in the course of time the application
of equity tends to result in rules that take the place of equity and introduce
a strictness that equity was meant to correct.11 The suggestion is clear: this
historical process can be reversed and the original meaning of good faith
restored.
7 See Meijers 1937, p. 281.
8 Among legal historians this was the generally accepted view about Roman law. See H.R.
Hoetink, ‘De beperkendewerking van de goede trouw bij overeenkomsten’, Tijdschrift voor
Rechtsgeschiedenis 1928-8, pp. 417-438.
9 Meijers mentions fifteen decisions of the Dutch Supreme Court for the years between 1925
and 1936. See Meijers 1937, p. 281 n. 4.
10 Meijers 1937, pp. 282-283.
11 Meijers 1937, pp. 284-285. In 1918 Meijers had not given this historical explanation
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All these deeper insights into the workings of law in history were only
a preparation for dealing with what would seem to be the legal culture most
resistant to the acceptance of good faith as ameans to curtail the express terms
of a contract: the English legal culture. Neither common law nor equity
authorised an English judge to bring about a material change in a contractual
obligation with a plea of good faith. Also in this case Meijers came with
(historical) explanations: English lawwould have needed a stronger emphasis
on legal security and pacta sunt servanda in order to counterbalance the freedom
of judges to develop their own rules.12 It will be clear that this excursion into
the territory of comparative law had as yet not offered much scope for a
renaissance of the original Roman-law interpretation of good faith. To increase
the sense of urgency Meijers therefore referred to the actual economic and
political situation in Europe, meanwhile keeping a secret weapon near at hand
for the decisive turn of his argument.
WhenMeijers delivered his speech among his fellowmembers of the Royal
Academy the effects of the economic crisis of the thirties (of the 20th century)
were still badly felt. In France as in the Netherlands, and even in England,
the legal community discussed the question whether a fundamental change
of circumstances should have any impact on the obligations of a contract made
in less barren times. It is not without significance for the general atmosphere
in the Netherlands that two years earlier a colleague and friend of Meijers,
the historian Johan Huizinga [1872-1945] had published a book entitled In de
schaduwen van morgen (In the Shadow of Tomorrow), which had an enormous
success, also abroad, and painted the future of European culture in dark
colours, not so much because of the economic crisis and the threat of the
totalitarian regimes of Germany, Italy and Soviet Russia as because of its own
intellectual weaknesses.13 I doubt whether Meijers agreed with Huizinga’s
rather old-mannish analysis. He would certainly have paid more attention
to the social and economic aspects of the crisis. It does not matter: the feeling
of being witness to a cultural crisis was widespread among the intellectual
elite.14
12 Meijers 1937, p. 286.
13 The book appeared in 1935 in Dutch andwas reprinted several times. Translations followed
soon: German (1935), English, Spanish, Swedish (all 1936), Italian, Norwegian (both 1937),
Hungarian, Czech (both 1938), French (1939).
14 Even the literary critic Menno ter Braak [1902-1940], who always had problems with
Huizinga’s noncommittal professorial attitude,wrote a favourable review although hewas
critical of Huizinga’s use of the concept of ‘culture’. See his Verzameld werk.Vol. 5, Amster-
dam: Van Oorschot 1980, pp. 625-631. The erudite Amsterdam professor of Roman law
Hoetink also had reserves of a more historical nature. See P.B.M. Blaas,Henk Hoetink (1900-
1963), een intellectuele biografie, Hilversum:Verloren 2010, pp. 70-71. Recommended reading
is the essay ‘Kan de tijd tekens geven?’ by Hermans, in which Huizinga’s fear of cultural
decline is placed in a tradition of irrational fear of technological change. SeeW.F. Hermans,
Van Wittgenstein tot Weinreb. Het sadistische universum 2, Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij 1970,
pp. 86-109 (at 92-109).
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This is not the place to elaborate on the details, but up to this moment
Meijers had along the lines of classical rhetoric prepared his audience for the
decisive argument that should overcome all doubts. His speech had reached
the rhetorical moment of the confirmatio. It was time to place the secret weapon
in position.
3 THE IMPLIED CONDITION
Legal cultures, Meijers argued, which do not allowmuch scope for good faith
or equity usually have another concept to mitigate the extreme consequences
of contractual obligations: the implied condition. There followed an impressive
panorama beginning with the early reception of Roman law in the twelfth
century, when the classical view on good faith was soon reduced to a dim
existencewhereas at the same time the implied condition began its unstoppable
rise.15 In the civilian tradition of legal science the concept clausula rebus sic
stantibus and themaxim cessante causa cessat effectus began to spread their wings
over areas of law they never had been intended for. The implied condition
also moved up to the centre of the law of contracts and remained there for
centuries as a companion of the pacta sunt servanda principle.16
It is not necessary to discussMeijers’s interesting remarks about the devel-
opments in France and England, their aim being evident: also in these countries
there were and are possibilities to tackle the problem of imprévision by means
of the concept of implied condition. These remarks had another purpose as
well: to prepare his Dutch audience for a renewed, if possible decisive attack
on the Supreme Court. Meijers gave several examples of the use of the implied
condition byDutch judges as a tool to adjust the binding force of an obligation,
including a few decisions by the Supreme Court itself, in which it all but used
the concept, and, against its own doctrine, admitted that strict adherence to
contractual obligations would in unforeseeable and fundamentally changed
circumstances lead to unfair consequences.17 Meijers: why does the Supreme
Court not say so in similar cases? This is, of course, a typically ‘continental’
question. An English judge would always find some reason why in another
case he should decide differently. AndMeijers knew this, but he had reached
the rhetorical phase of the refutatio, which was not only intended for jurists
belonging to the civilian tradition.
15 Meijers 1937, pp. 287-289.
16 For a recent overview see A. Thier, Legal history, in: E.H. Hondius & H.C. Grigoleit (eds.),
Unexpected Circumstances in European Contract Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
2011, pp. 15-32. In the context of our subject it should be mentioned that the first author
who rejected the clausula in its entirety was not a German but Cornelis van Bynkershoek
[1673-1743], a member of the Supreme Court of Holland and Zeeland since 1704, and its
president as of 1724. See already Meijers 1918, p. 29 note 11 and p. 31.
17 Meijers 1937, pp. 290-295.
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If I may summarise what Meijers implicitly said to refute all possible
objections: why all this fuss about good faith? Behind the ‘mask’ of the implied
condition you will always find the same idea when it comes to its application
to a specific case. Away with this artificial construct! Admittedly, the concept
of implied condition has advantages in practice.18 But a just and fair legal
system requires a kind of justice that is not derived from the supposed will
of the parties to a contract. As it was in good old Rome. In this refutatio we
see the ‘decent man’ (fatsoenlijk mensch) appear for the first time. This is a
person who does what he should do (or omit to do) according to objective
standards of justice, regardless of his intentions, be they real or presumed.
He is the ideal contracting party who knows that law is more than the subject-
ive intentions of the parties.
It is not by accident that Meijers used the term ‘decent man’. The essayist
Menno ter Braak [1902-1940] had given currency to it – as honnête homme –
in two of his books, in the latter of which he accepted ‘fatsoenlijk mensch’
as its Dutch equivalent. That book had appeared at the beginning of 1937.19
I suppose in his speech Meijers wanted to show he was worried too about
the events in Germany and other countries. In 1936 he had been reluctant to
sign a declaration of Ter Braak and seven other Dutch intellectuals against
the threat of National Socialism to society, culture and science.20 I do not
exclude thatMeijers thought it wiser not to sign, as the signature of an assured
victim of National Socialism might weaken the effect of the declaration. We
will see this decent man reappear in a slightly different shape in the speech
Meijers gave in 1950, after WW II.
The peroratio was brief and realistic: the implied condition in its various
forms will not disappear soon because of its practical advantages, but legal
science should not give in and continue to defend the good faith of Roman
times.21 The audiencewill have applauded politely butwholeheartedly. These
were words of wisdom in a world full of war and the threat of war. Even
Eggens [1891-1964], who did not share Meijers’s approach to law, and who
is reported to have said ‘wat zou ik willen dat ik de hersens van Meijers had,
want ik zou er nog mee kunnen denken ook’ (I wish I had the brains of
18 Meijers writes that for judges the implied condition offers better possibilities to change
the law without openly saying so. And parties will be more inclined to accept a decision
based on their supposed own will than on an abstract kind of justice. See Meijers 1937,
pp. 297-299.
19 The former book was Politicus zonder partij (Politician without a Party) of 1934. The latter
was entitledVan oude en nieuwe christenen (Of Old andNewChristians). The honnête homme
is discussed on page 32 to 49 of the Rotterdam first edition of 1937. The translation ‘fatsoen-
lijk mensch’ can be found on page 48.
20 See Blaas 2010, pp. 72-74. Meijers, and some of his Leiden colleagues also, refused to sign
anothermore successful protest later that year. To the disappointment of one of its initiators:
Hoetink. See Blaas 2010, pp. 74-78.
21 Meijers 1937, p. 300.
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Meijers, because I would also use them to think),22 in 1958 spoke of a magis-
terial speech.23 We cannot deny that Meijers did have foresight: neither he
nor Eggens lived to see the Dutch Supreme Court switch over to the view he
had defended so eloquently.
4 ROME, JULY 1950
In 1940 war did not pass over the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and as a Jew,
Meijers was one of the marked victims of the German occupation. He lost his
professorship at Leiden University and was deported with his family to a
concentration camp. They survived and he returned, his spirit apparently
unbroken. He resumed his position at the university but not for long, because
in 1947 he received a commission from the Dutch government to prepare a
new codification of private law, a long-time wish of his. It did not keep him
from publishing and maintaining his contacts with foreign jurists. In the
context of the latterMeijers returned to the subject of change of circumstances.
In July 1950 he made a speech (in French) at the Congrès international de droit
privé (Unidroit) in Rome about the binding force of contracts and their modifica-
tion in modern law.24
It was briefer than the 1918 and 1937 speeches, and more practical.25 After
stating that the theory of imprévision and the doctrine of frustration are especial-
ly important in periods of economic instability, as the world had seen after
the First World War, and that state intervention had become more common,
also in contractual relations, Meijers immediately enumerated four solutions
to the problem posed: 1. the implied condition 2. the principle of good faith
3. statutory rules for specific cases 4. statutory rules of a more general char-
acter. Each of these solutions was discussed briefly and illustrated with
examples from history and from various European countries, as only a scholar
of the stature of Meijers could do. Although there were some examples from
22 The source of this quote is G.E. Langemeijer, at the time Eggens’s colleague in the Dutch
Supreme Court. See J.M. van Dunné, P. Boeles & A.J. Heerma van Voss, Acht civilisten in
burger, Zwolle: Tjeenk Willink 1977, p. 135.
23 See J. Eggens, Over het fingeren van rechtsficties (speech Amsterdam 24 februari 1958),
Haarlem: Erven F. Bohn 1958; reissued inVerzamelde privaatrechtelijke opstellen. Deel 2,Alphen
a/d Rijn: Samson 1959, p. 314-328; reprinted in H.C.F. Schoordijk & J.M. Smits (eds.), Eggens
bundel, Overveen: Belvédère 1998, pp. 440-454 (on p. 453). Eggens speaks of an organic
whole (‘organisch geheel’). He does not seem to have noticed the rhetorical structure of
this organic whole.
24 The title was: ‘La force obligatoire des contrats et ses modifications dans les droits moder-
nes’. The easiest way to consult it is in R. Feenstra, H.F.W.D. Fischer, M.E. Blok & F.B.J.
Wubbe (eds.), Bibliographie der geschriften van Prof. mr. E.M. Meijers, Leiden: Universitaire
Pers Leiden 1957, pp. 297-309.
25 It contains elements of both previous speeches, and not only of the 1918 speech, as the
editor’s note to the latter would seem to suggest. See Meijers 1918, p. 27 n. *.
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Dutch practice and doctrine, and from England and France, several other
countries werementioned aswell: Germany, Switzerland, Belgium,Hungary,
Poland, Italy, Greece, and Egypt (its brand-new decidedly French Code civil
of 1949). Everybody who is familiar with Meijers’s drafts for the new Dutch
private law code will recognise his comparative method.26
This method not only involved a list of countries and their particular
solutions, it was immediately followed by a list of the common elements in
their doctrine and statutory law. Meijers noted five common elements for a
plea of imprévision: 1. unforeseeability 2. exceptionality 3. not due to the
debtor’s fault 4. beyond his normal sphere of risk 5. excessively onerous for
the debtor to comply with.27 A few remarks were added about Swiss, French,
English, and German case law insofar as each of these countries had adopted
concepts of a (slightly) different nature.
After some remarks on the various possible effects of imprévision on a
contract, Meijers came to the quintessential question: which of these solutions
is to be preferred? Meijers: a solution that suits all (European) countries men-
tioned cannot be given. A sobering answer. Probably also a realistic one if
you consider the political situation in 1950. The European countries (except
for Switzerland) were impoverished and were only beginning to regain their
economic strength. In spite of a serious weakening of some colonial empires
(India and Pakistan 1947, Indonesia 1949), most European countries still
thought of themselves as masters of the world. The first armed conflict of the
Cold War had only recently broken out (Korean War 25th June 1950). Who
would like to be reminded of the hardships of war and economic crisis, and
think about their possible effect on contractual obligations? Meijers did not
say so, but his stress on the relation between economic (in)stability and the
doctrine of imprévision must have made him realise that the moment for a
unification of European law, the theme of the conference in Rome, was not
ideal. So he came to what in its essence was a moral appeal.
He returned to his ideal of the Roman bonae fidei contracts in their original
shape, as he had done in 1918 and 1937. Countries that honoured this concept
should perhaps make some additional statutory law to specify the conditions
to be met for a plea of imprévision. Thus the legislator might help the judiciary
to get a more precise idea of the situations that were envisaged. But please,
not too much: the legislator should not encroach upon the principle of pacta
sunt servanda, as it is understood by decent people (honnêtes gens), even in
unforeseen circumstances.28 These decent people had also appeared in
Meijers’s 1937 speech, in that case, however, to argue that a decent man is
26 On this method see in particular V.J.A. Sütö, Nieuw vermogensrecht en rechtsvergelijking –
Reconstructie van een wetgevingsproces (1947-1961) (thesis Leiden), Den Haag: Boom Juridische
uitgevers 2004.
27 Meijers 1950, p. 307.
28 Meijers 1950, pp. 308-309.
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someone who acts according to objective standards of justice, also if the
circumstances have dramatically changed. I use the word ‘however’, because
I feel there is a shift of emphasis in Meijers’s view on imprévision probably
connected with his activities as a legislator and perhaps his experiences in
wartime and thereafter.29
This time the learned audience will also have applauded the masterly
analysis and the very cautious recommendations. It should be remarked that
this audience consisted for the larger part of jurists from civil-law countries.30
The only British speaker gave a paper on the trust in English law. The United
States were represented by Hessel E. Yntema, who spoke about the bill of
exchange.31 It need not surprise us that less attention was paid to the Dutch
situation than in 1937. Still, the chances for a change in the direction Meijers
aimed at were certainly better there. He was working hard on his draft for
the new codification, and almost two years later the DutchMinister of Justice,
on behalf of Meijers, sent a list of questions (‘Vraagpunten’) to the Council
of Ministers. One of the questions was: should there be a provision (in the
new code) for the case in which unforeseen circumstances make the perform-
ance of a contract extremely onerous for one of the parties? An answer was
given by a standing committee of the Dutch parliament. It said that in such
a case the debtor should be able to ask the judge to modify or set aside the
contract. The Lower House of Parliament had a meeting about it on July 2nd
of the year 1953, in which Meijers replied to the remarks of some of its mem-
bers and inwhich the answer of the committee was acceptedwithout a formal
vote.32 It was the last public statement Meijers made about imprévision.
5 THE FINAL RESULT
Meijers continued with his work on the new codification until his death in
1954. He left drafts in various stages of completion. The draft for Book 6 (law
of obligations and contracts, general part), inwhich the provision on imprévision
was to have its place, was all but finished. The work on this book was carried
29 After the war Meijers fought a bitter battle against the bankers and stockbrokers who had
profited from the confiscation of Jewish property by the German authorities. These people
were in every respect the opposite to honnêtes gens. In an article that Meijers wrote about
a proposal for compensation of the victims or their surviving relatives his restrained anger
is palpable when he speaks of ‘deze personen’ (these persons) and ‘deze heren’ (these
<ungentle> men). See E.M. Meijers, Het voorstel van L.V.V.S. aan haar schuldeisers, Zwolle:
Tjeenk Willink 1950, p. 11.
30 This can be gathered from the report published in the Revue internationale de droit comparé,
Octobre-décembre 1950 (Vol. 2 no. 4), pp. 703-707 (available on the Internet on the site of
Persée.fr)
31 Yntema was of Dutch (better: Frisian) descent and knew Meijers well, especially because
of their shared interest in the history of private international law.
32 Handelingen II 1952/53, pp. 2766-2772.
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on by three persons each of whom had been allotted a part of it. This made
a revision by a fourth person necessary. For our purpose the exact details of
the legislative process are not important. Only this: what in 1961 was presented
asMeijers’s draft reveals the spirit of its original author. The relevant provision
was (in translation):33
1. Upon the request of one of the parties, the judge may modify a contract, or
set it aside in whole or in part on the basis of unforeseen circumstances which are
of such a nature that the cocontracting party, according to criteria of reasonableness
and equity, may not expect that the contract bemaintained in an unmodified form.
Themodification or the setting aside of the contract may be given retroactive force.
2. A request as referred to in par. 1 is refused to the extent that the circumstances
invoked by the plaintiff are accountable to him according to the nature of the
contract or common opinion.
3. For the purposes of this article, a person to whom a contractual right or obliga-
tion has been transferred, is assimilated to a contracting party.
In the commentary on this provision the hand of the master was still visible
as well.34 We find references to the codes of Egypt, Greece, Italy, and Poland,
to which Meijers had referred in his 1950 speech in Rome. The discussions
that followed about this draft and its commentary need not keep us.35 What
counts is the final result. This was achieved in 1992when the bulk of the newly
codified law of property was put into force. The relevant provision is article
258 of Book 6. It states:36
1. Upon the demand of one of the parties, the judge may modify the effects of
a contract, or he may set it aside in whole or in part on the basis of unforeseen
circumstances which are of such a nature that the cocontracting party, according
to criteria of reasonableness and equity, may not expect that the contract be main-
tained in an unmodified form. The modification or the setting aside of the contract
may be given retroactive force.
2. The modification or the setting aside of the contract is not pronounced to the
extent that the person invoking the circumstances should be accountable for them
according to the nature of the contract or common opinion.
3. For the purposes of this article, a person to whom a contractual right or obliga-
tion has been transferred, is assimilated to a contracting party.
33 For this translation I owe much to the translation mentioned in note 36.
34 For both the draft and the commentary I used M.M. Olthof & J.W. du Pon, Parlementaire
geschiedenis van het nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek, Boeken 3,5 en 6, Deventer: Kluwer 1982, pp.
771-774 (Artikel 6.5.3.11).
35 For a detailed discussion see J.M. van Dunné, ‘De goede trouw in het Gewijzigd Ontwerp
Boek 6NieuwBW’,WPNR 1976 (5371), pp. 747-755; reissued in J.W.M.K.Meijer et al. (eds.),
Normatief Uitgelegd, Verzamelde privaatrechtelijke opstellen van J.M. van Dunné, Deventer:
Kluwer 2006, pp. 849-863.
36 Translation of P.P.C. Haanappel & E. Mackaay, Netherlands Civil Code, Book 6. It can easily
be consulted on the Internet.
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As anybody can see, the differences between the draft and the final version
are minimal and a matter of wording. It can be said without reservations that
eventuallyMeijers had his way in the sense that the Dutch Civil Code contains
a provision about imprévision based on the principle of good faith (in modern
terminology ‘reasonableness and equity’), sufficiently specified to give a judge
the necessary guidelines for a balanced judgment.
In Dutch case law his victory came earlier. There is no unanimity about
this. According to some authors it happened in 1967when theDutch Supreme
Court decided that under certain circumstances an appeal to an exculpatory
clause can be excluded.37 This meant that an express provision in a contract
can be set aside. In 1976, in a similar case, the Dutch Supreme Court ruled
that under such circumstances an appeal to an exculpatory clause is against
the requirements of good faith.38 These two cases were not downright cases
of imprévision. The first decision of the Dutch Supreme Court where a funda-
mental change of circumstances was the reason to set aside a contract was
taken in 1977. It concerned a physician who had an unlimited contract with
the Dutch National Health Service. The physician had committed fraud with
his account bills and the Health Service wanted to terminate the contract, but
the contract contained no clause about this. The Dutch Supreme Court ruled
that under these unforeseen and very serious circumstances, according to
criteria of reasonableness and equity, the physician should not expect the
contract to be maintained in its unlimited form.39 The attentive reader will
recognise the phrasing of the 1961 draft.
By 1984 there was no longer any doubt about the existence in Dutch law
of a plea of imprévision based on good faith.40 Meijers had finally beaten the
resistance against his view on imprévision. That the judges declared that unfore-
seen circumstances should not be assumed too easily was not something he
had not acknowledged.
6 WHAT IF MEIJERS HAD LIVED TODAY
At the moment of Meijers’s death this was all beyond the horizon. Still, it
would be interesting to know what a great jurist like Meijers would have to
say about today’s situation.
37 Dutch Supreme Court 19 May 1967, NJ 1967, 261 (Saladin/HBU).
38 Dutch Supreme Court 20 February 1976, NJ 1976, 486 (Pseudovogelpest).
39 Dutch Supreme Court 16 December 1977, NJ 1978, 136 (Ziekenfonds).
40 Dutch Supreme Court 27 April 1984, NJ 1984, 679 (Nationale Volksbank – Sipke Helder).
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WARNING: THIS SECTION CONTAINS FICTIONAL MATERIAL
As I do not possess a time machine to go back to him, the only way to know
this is to let him embark on a time machine and come to us. First of all, a
preliminary question has to be asked: is the Europeanworld we live in funda-
mentally different from the Europe of 1950? Sure, there is a European Union
now, and there is European legislation in some areas of private law. But a
general provision on the subject of imprévision only exists in the form of drafts,
usually called principles. Europe still is a loosely organised set of countries,
and the essential prerequisite for a unification of the law, a political union,
is lacking as ever before. What keeps them together is economic profit and
wealth. And economic profit and wealth can be subject to forces beyond the
control of even the largest countries. Here we touch on Meijers’s deeper view
on imprévision: it is connected to economic (in)stability and to the possibilities
of state intervention. We would have to tell him about the financial crisis of
the autumn of 2008, and about its effects on the European countries. He would
be bitterly reminded of the war to hear that those who profited from dubious
financial constructions, and were the main cause of the crisis, in Europe as
a rule were saved from bankruptcy by the taxpayers, who, as a rule, had seen
little money coming to the state treasury when fortunes were made before
the crisis broke out. The taxpayers had to be grateful that their savings had
not disappeared into the black holes of banks going bankrupt. The 1929 crash
has had worse consequences, indeed, but new threats to economic stability
have emerged: European countries that do not obey the rules that are necessary
to keep up a common currency. Again the taxpayer sees that public funds
are spent on institutions that are supposed to protect his interests, this time
to save disobedient countries and indirectly the banks that have bought their
government bonds. Nodebt reductions as yet, only postponement of payment:
the pacta sunt servanda principle saved! To save countries that did not keep
to it.
What would Meijers say to this, having had some time to collect the
necessary information, which did not take him long? He produced a small
checklist containing the following points:
1. pacta sunt servanda is the rule, a plea of imprévision the exception
2. a plea of imprévision cannot be made by a party at whose risk it is
3. a statutory provision should be based on objective criteria
4. a statutory provision should contain some specifications as to its application
Then he continued. ‘If there are still honnêtes gens these days, they should know
that, as a rule, they should keep their promises. Only in exceptional casesmay
a judge decide otherwise on the basis of objective criteria. The Romans did
so too. Talking about the Romans: recently there has been a discussion in South
Africa, a country where civil law and common law go side by side, about the
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exceptio doli generalis as a remedy in cases of imprévision.41 In Roman times
this exceptio was available to a defendant who claimed that his plaintiff was
not acting in good faith by bringing an action against him under the given
circumstances. In itself this remedy would be fitting to some cases of impré-
vision, and I do not object to the modern use of old concepts. This exceptio,
however, has the smell of strict law about it. It was superfluous in caseswhere
a bonae fidei contract was involved, and we had better not revive that part of
the Roman law heritage, as all our contracts are considered to be bonae fidei.’
Meijers had again shown his mastery of the subject and was about to go
back into his timemachine (‘My time has run out. I have to leave.’). Somebody
said: ‘One last question please: what do you think of the article about impré-
vision in the DCFR?’ What exactly happened I do not know to this day. All I
can remember is that he turned away his face from the people listening to
him, and carefully entered the vehicle. The last words I am sure I have heard
him say before its door closed noiselessly were: ‘It is ….’. About the following
word therewas and is no agreement. Some imagined having heard ‘futurism’.
Others thought it had been something like ‘bull…’. Personally, I do not believe
that Meijers would have put it so strongly.
7 EPILOGUE
As I do not believe in what-if history, we have to return from an imagined
present to the actual present. In fact they do not differ much. If we take a look
at the juristic analysis of the imprévision problem by an authority like Treitel,
we see the same elements as thosementioned byMeijers.42 There is something
perennial about the relationship between the principle of pacta sunt servanda
and the concept of the clausula rebus sic stantibus, at least since the sixteenth
century. Today’s solutions go back to that period. And every country cherishes
its own of the limited number of solutions. There are no new solutions. The
exceptio doli generalis mentioned in the preceding section is another example
of these voices from the past. Every survey of the doctrine and practice of the
various European countries will show remarkable similarities to the oneMeijers
gave in his 1950 speech. And always it will be said that the various solutions
41 This is not (science) fiction. The discussion has been rekindled through a note in a decision
of the Constitutional Court (CrownRestaurant vGold Reef City Theme Park, 6March 2007).
The Supreme Court of Appeal, which thought it had buried the exceptio doli generalis as
a ‘superfluous, defunct anachronism’ (See Bank of Lisbon and South Africa v Ornelas; 30
March 1988), returned to the subject last year (Bredenkamp v Standard Bank; 27 March
2010). Again this court tried to silence theminority judgment in the 1988 case. It is doubtful
whether this will be the end of the discussion. Cf. R. Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations,
Cape Town/Deventer: Juta/Kluwer 1992, p. 677. All the South African cases mentioned
can be consulted on the Internet.
42 See G.H. Treitel, The Law of Contract, London: Sweet & Maxwell 1995, pp. 832-837.
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are essentially the same and appear to be growing nearer to each other. This
is not true. Legal traditions are very tough and hard to change, as Meijers’s
own experience has shown. Only political power can effect a change if there
is not some intrinsic necessity that compels people to abandon their cherished
and familiar ways.
At this moment the market value of Europe, also in terms of political
power, is not very high. This may change, as everybody knows. Especially
crises are recommended as ameans to promote cooperation. The financial crisis
of 2008 is bearing fruit in the sense that large banks are now forced to keep
larger reserves. This certainly is important, as some other measures are about
supervision of the credit system. But this is public law born out of the necessity
to prevent the downfall of banks that are essential to the credit system of a
country. In private law it works differently, more slowly, especially if it con-
cerns ‘old law’. Meijers has been able to influence Dutch case law with his
draft on imprévision, and, of course, when it had gained force of law. It was
the chance of a lifetime. Such chances are very rare. I do not expect it to be
repeated soon on a European level. Where Meijers had to fight on one front,
their number are manifold now. Should it occur nonetheless, it would be a
typical case of imprévision.
